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UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
 	   I	  can’t	  help	  but	  dream	  about	  a	  kind	  of	  criticism	  that	  would	  try	  not	  to	  judge	  but	  to	  bring	  an	  oeuvre,	  a	  book,	  a	  sentence,	  an	  idea	  to	  life;	  it	  would	  light	  fires,	  watch	  the	  grass	  grow,	  listen	  to	  the	  wind,	  and	  catch	  the	  sea	  foam	  in	  the	  breeze	  and	  scatter	  it.	  It	  would	  multiply	  not	  judgements	  but	  signs	  of	  existence;	  it	  would	  summon	  them,	  drag	  them	  from	  their	  sleep.	  Perhaps	  it	  would	  invent	  them	  sometimes—all	  the	  better.	  All	  the	  better.	  Criticism	  that	  hands	  down	  sentences	  sends	  me	  to	  sleep;	  I’d	  like	  a	  criticism	  of	  scintillating	  leaps	  of	  the	  imagination.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  sovereign	  or	  dressed	  in	  red.	  It	  would	  bear	  the	  lightning	  of	  possible	  storms.	  Michel	  Foucault,	  ‘The	  Masked	  Philosopher’1	  
	  The	  multiplication	   of	   ‘signs	   of	   existence’.2	   And	   their	   invention	   sometimes.	  What	   a	  challenge!	  Foucault	  knew	  very	  well	  that	  judgement	  is	  practised	  all	  the	  time,	  that	  it	  is	  ‘one	  of	  the	  simplest	  things	  that	  mankind	  has	  been	  given	  to	  do’,	  yet	  his	  gift	  to	  us	  is	  a	  dream	  of	  some	  other	  activity	  for	  criticism.	  He	  was	  conscious,	  as	  we	  still	  are,	  that	  the	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practice	   of	   the	  humanities	   seminar,	  where	   students	   are	   trained	   to	   become	   certain	  kinds	  of	  subjects,	  focuses	  on	  the	  refinement	  of	  judgement,	  including	  the	  calibration	  of	  moral	  thresholds,	  the	  creation	  of	  taste,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  an	  ear	  for	  tone.	  If	  students	  graduate	  from	  that	  seminar	  self-­‐confident	  enough	  to	  judge	  what	  is	  true	  and	  beautiful,	  the	  tutor	  will	  have	  done—no	  doubt	  about	  it—an	  excellent	  job.	  Now,	  over	   twenty	  years	   later,	  Bruno	  Latour	   comes	  along	  with	  his	   criticism	  of	  critique.	   His	   ‘tone’	   is	   satirical,	   and	   his	  method	   ethnographic	   as	   he	   describes	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  very	  graduate	  school	  that	  delivers	  the	  kinds	  of	  critical	  moves	  needed	  for	  judging	  truth	  and	  beauty:	  Enter	   here,	   you	   poor	   folks.	   After	   arduous	   years	   of	   reading	   turgid	   prose,	  you	  will	  be	  always	  right,	  you	  will	  never	  be	  taken	  in	  any	  more;	  no	  one,	  no	  matter	  how	  powerful,	  will	  be	  able	   to	  accuse	  you	  of	  naïvité,	   that	   supreme	  sin,	  any	  longer?	  Better	  equipped	  than	  Zeus	  himself	  you	  rule	  alone,	  striking	  from	   above	   with	   the	   salvo	   of	   antifetishism	   in	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   solid	  causality	  of	  objectivity	  in	  the	  other.	  The	  only	  loser	  is	  the	  naïve	  believer,	  the	  great	  unwashed,	  always	  caught	  off	  balance.	  Is	  it	  so	  surprising,	  after	  all,	  that	  with	  such	  positions	  given	  to	  the	  object,	  the	  humanities	  have	  lost	  the	  hearts	  of	  their	  fellow	  citizens,	  that	  they	  had	  to	  retreat	  year	  after	  year,	  entrenching	  themselves	   always	   further	   in	   the	   narrow	   barracks	   left	   to	   them	   by	  more	  and	  more	  stingy	  deans?	  The	  Zeus	  of	  Critique	  rules	  absolutely,	   to	  be	  sure,	  but	  over	  a	  desert.3	  Both	  French	  writers	  owe	  something	   to	  Nietzsche,	  and	   indeed	  Antonin	  Artaud,	  in	  their	  elaborations	  of	  the	  violence	  of	  judgement	  and	  the	  arrogant	  righteousness	  of	  critique,	   coupled	  with	   a	   sneering	   disdain	   for	  mere	   facts.	   The	   genealogy	   of	   critical	  judgment	  can	  also	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  university	  model	  established	  by	  Emmanuel	  Kant	  in	   early	  modern	   Europe	  when	   certain	   core	   values	   could	   still	   be	   fairly	   confidently	  asserted.4	  Today,	  that	  Kantian	  Christian	  transcendentalism	  is	  no	  longer	  centre	  stage	  in	  a	  multicultural	  world	  where	   few	  such	  core	  values	  can	  be	   taken	   for	  granted,	  but	  must	  be	  negotiated,	  even	  in	  the	  micropolitics	  of	  the	  classroom.	  Rather	  than	  continue	  the	  criticism	  of	  critique	  directly,	  I	  will	  pursue	  instead	  an	  experiment	  with	   the	  experimental,	   an	  alternative	   thread	   in	   continental	  philosophy	  which	  seeks	  to	  provide	  (hopefully)	  a	  more	  realistic	  vision	  of	  collective	  assemblages	  of	   life-­‐forms,	  where	   the	   human	   (paradoxically	   for	   the	   humanities)	   finds	   itself	   less	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centred.	   It	   emerges	   from	   its	   roots	   in	   Spinoza,	   Bergson	   and	   Diderot,	   continues	   via	  Deleuze	   and	   Guattari,	   then	   William	   James	   and	   A.N.	   Whitehead,	   who	   have	   been	  revived	  in	  recent	  years.	  What	   do	   I	   mean	   by	   ‘experiment’?	   I	   define	   the	   concept	   in	   two	   ways,	   first	   by	  contrasting	  it	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  judgement	  in	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  prose	  we	  call	  criticism.	   Experimental	   writing,	   for	   me,	   would	   be	   writing	   that	   necessarily	  participates	  in	  worlds	  rather	  than	  a	  writing	  constituted	  as	  a	  report	  on	  realities	  seen	  from	   the	   other	   side	   of	   an	   illusory	   gap	   of	   representation.	   Judgement	   is	   enabled	   by	  such	   gaps,	   and	  we	   give	   them	   names	   like	   ‘critical	   distance’,	   ‘omniscient	   overview’,	  ‘hindsight’	   or	   ‘perspective’.5	  Knowing	   that	   forms	  of	   judgment	   are	   unavoidable,	   the	  move	   to	   the	   experimental	   attitude	   involves	   reflecting	   on	   the	   formation	   of	   such	  critical	  subjectivities.	  How	  does	  critical	  prose,	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  would	  judge,	  earn	  the	  right	  to	  its	  ‘critical	  distance’?	  By	  what	  steps	  does	  one	  get	  to	  this	  position	  of	  critique?	  By	  contrast,	  the	  experimental	  alternative	  is	  contingent	  and	  negotiable	  and	  prefers	  to	  ask	   how	   one	   earns	   the	   right	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   event—the	   seminar,	   the	  colloquium,	  the	  multidisciplinary	  research	  project.	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  experimental	  writing	  I	  envisage	  is	  not	  about	  breaking	  free	  of	  convention,	  but	  is	  actively	  engaged	  in	  creating	  assemblages	  or	  compositions	  as	  it	  goes	  along.	  This	  engagement	  may	  be	  with	  different	  registers	  of	  reality,	  because	  ‘the	  world’	   is	  not	  seen	  as	  bifurcated,	  with	   the	   ‘text’	  mediating	   the	   ‘subject’	  and	   the	  ‘object’,	   as	   in	   older	   communication	   models.6	   In	   this	   multirealist	   environment,	  writing	   cannot	   elevate	   the	   subject	   to	   a	   transcendent/romantic	   position,	   where	  human	  imagination	  ‘creates	  worlds’	  so	  as	  to	  redeem	  a	  lost	  plenitude.	  Because	  of	  its	  constant	   imbrications	   or	   engagements,	   it	   seems	   to	  make	  more	   sense	   to	   support	   it	  with	   an	   immanent/vitalist	   conceptual	   architecture.	   John	   Rajchman’s	   position	   on	  Deleuzian	   philosophy	   summarises	   this	   difference,	   characterising	   Deleuze’s	   radical	  empiricism	   as	   an	   ‘empiricism	   that	   tries	   to	   push	   beyond	   judgment	   to	   an	   invention	  and	   an	   affirmation	   that	   precedes	   it—to	   that	   point	   where	   experimentation	   in	  philosophy	  becomes	  inseparable	  from	  vitalism’.7	  So	   I	   am	   catching	   on	   to	   the	   vitalist	   thread	   in	   contemporary	   philosophical	  thought	  from	  Bergson	  to	  the	  post-­‐Deleuzians.	  And	  in	  the	  other	  hand	  I	  am	  holding	  a	  thread	   from	   Indigenous	   Australian	   thought,	   also	   vitalist,	   which	   taught	   me	   about	  ‘keeping	  things	  alive	  in	  their	  place’	  to	  create	  a	  slogan.8	  I	  want	  to	  see	  what	  these	  two	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threads	   can	  do	   for	   a	  writing	  practice	   and	  even	  a	   literary	   theory	   that	   are	   localised,	  rather	   than	  universal	   in	  aspiration.	  They	  constitute	  events	  performed	   in	  particular	  places.	  I	   speak	   of	   ‘keeping	   things	   alive	   in	   their	   place’	   because	   it	   encapsulates	  what	   I	  have	  learned	  from	  Aboriginal	  elders	  in	  Australia	  about	  the	  maintenance	  of	  cultures;	  authors	   like	  Paddy	  Roe,	  David	  Mowaljarlai	   and	  David	  Unaipon.9	  For	   them,	   singing,	  dancing,	   writing,	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   performance,	   are	   not	   communicative	   items	  created	  for	  distribution.	  They	  are	  more	  like	  ecological	  events,	  existing	  more	  spatially	  than	  temporally;	  they	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  sacred	  country.	  And	  there	  are	  protocols	  of	  participation:	  who	  is	  the	  ‘boss’	  for	  this	  particular	  performance,	  and	  how	  are	  rights	  to	  participation	   earned?	   Who	   can	   watch	   and	   listen?	   How	   are	   non-­‐human	   things	  earning	   their	   rights	   to	   participate?	   Plants,	   animals	   and	  waterholes,	   but	   also	   other	  registers	  of	  reality	   like	  spirits,	  dreams	  and	  fictional	  beings.	   ‘Keeping	  things	  alive	   in	  their	  place’	  is	  an	  a-­‐modern	  vision.	  For	  if	  a	  modern	  genre	  like	  the	  detective	  story	  can	  become	   popular	   and	   spread	   around	   the	   world	   thanks	   to	   the	   machinery	   of	  mechanical	  reproduction	  and	  reproductive	  machinery	  of	  capitalist	  organisation,	  that	  is	   one	   kind	   of	   networking	   that	   certainly	   functions	   well,	   but	   transcends	   specific	  places.	   If	   one	   is	  more	   interested	   in	   cultural	   forms	   that	  have	   local	   coordinates,	   one	  might	   see	   them	  with	   their	   tendrils	   embedded	   ecologically,	   like	   roots	   from	   a	   seed.	  Does	  a	  seed	  have	  imperial	  ambitions,	  like	  the	  modernist	  commodity?	  Certainly,	  and	  weeds	  will	  take	  over	  the	  garden	  in	  their	  own	  unique	  ways	  of	  moving	  through	  their	  world.	   But	   they	   are	   limited	   by	   their	   resources,	   including	   the	   humans	   who	   chose	  what	  kind	  of	  culture	  they	  want	  to	  nurture.	  	  A	  second	  aspect	  of	  my	  experimental	  attitude	   involves	  speculation,	  and	   for	  me	  that	  means	   asking	   about	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   relations	  between	   things,	   relations	   that	  are	  not	  dominated	  by	  the	  human	  experience	  of	  those	  things.10	  That	  is	  a	  hard	  task,	  for	  how	  do	  you	   imagine	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  snail	  and	  the	   leaf	   it	   is	  eating	  (which	   is	  perfectly	   real	   as	   a	   relation)	   without	   anthropocentrism,	   without	   scientific	  reductionism,	  even	  without	   language?	  That’s	  one	  problem,	  especially	  pertinent	   for	  the	   field	   of	   ecological	   writing,	   conceived	   of	   as	   non-­‐human	   centred	   (and	   therefore	  giving	  agency	   to	  non-­‐humans),	   empirical,	   and	  engaged	   in	   that	   contingent	  on-­‐going	  fashion	  described	  above.	  	  
	   	  VOLUME18 NUMBER1 MAR2012	  44 
—KAWASAKI W650 The	  sign	  says:	  In	  my	  world	  home	  loans	  are	  flexible.	  Catching	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  Citibank	  advertisement	  as	  I	  zip	  by.	  The	  guy	  looks,	  well,	  relaxed.	  ‘My	  world’,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  in	  movement.	  I	  am	  riding	  a	  kind	  of	  work	  of	  art,	  a	  Kawasaki	  W650	  recreated	  as	  a	  café	   racer	   by	   the	   Deus	   Ex	   Machina	   design	   concept	   workshop	   in	   Camperdown.	   A	  beautiful	   engine	   in	   the	   British	   twin	   style,	   but	   with	   the	   bevelled	   gear	   driving	   the	  overhead	  cam.	  It’s	  all	  silver	  and	  black;	  Daytona	  headlight	  and	  speedo,	  Nitrohead	  seat	  and	  Deus	  custom	  P-­‐Nut	  aluminium	  tank.	  The	  speedo	  seems	  to	  read	  10	  per	  cent	  too	  slow.	  The	  tuned	  length	  ‘Up	  ’n’	  Over’	  scrambler	  pipes	  burble	  happily	  at	  low	  revs	  and	  ‘play	  Mantovani	  over	  3000rpm’,	  as	   the	  writer	  down	  at	  Deus	  says.	  As	   rider,	   I	   could	  say	   that	  my	   ‘judgement’	   in	   taking	   corners	   is	   ‘critical’,	   just	   to	   remind	  us	  of	   another	  way	  these	  words	  slumber	  in	  everyday	  usage.	  	  Is	   that	   all?	   No,	   my	   world	   is	   also	   something	   much	   more	   ancient	   and	   equally	  subtle.	  It	  is	  a	  machine-­‐human	  assemblage	  where	  the	  machine	  itself,	  to	  be	  straddled	  by	   one	   or	   two	   people	   for	   rapid	   movement,	   seems	   to	   derive	   some	   of	   its	   form	   or	  capacities	  from	  the	  horse.	  Yet	  this	  assemblage	  is	  based	  also	  on	  the	  ancient	  invention	  of	  the	  wheel,	  not	  only	  the	  two	  large	  ones,	  but	  the	  constellation	  of	  cogs	  and	  gears	  that	  play	  their	  own	  versions	  of	  Mantovani	  in	  the	  drive	  train.	  And	  the	  even	  more	  ancient	  material	  of	  its	  power,	  derived	  as	  it	  is	  from	  a	  refined	  essence	  of	  decayed	  and	  liquefied	  carboniferous	  rain	  forests	  from	  a	  much,	  much	  older	  world.	  A	  leaf	  fell	  from	  a	  dinosaur’s	  mouth	  into	  the	  river	  and	  that	  was	  the	  carbon	  in	  the	  explosion	   in	   the	   left	   cylinder	   of	   the	   W650	   just	   now,	   just	   perhaps.	   There	   are	  pathways	   crisscrossing	   time	   and	   space	   from	   the	   ancient	   to	   the	   modern,	   making	  multiple	   pleats	   of	   time	   in	   the	   present,	   and	   I	   won’t	   go	   into	   any	   detail	   about	   the	  pathway	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   internal	   combustion	   engine,	   going	   back,	   the	  myth	  says,	  to	  James	  Watt	  sitting	  in	  his	  mother’s	  kitchen	  and	  noticing	  the	  rattle	  of	  the	  lid	  of	  the	   kettle.	   A	   transfer	   of	   vitality,	   but	   from	   what	   to	   what?	   Watt	   to	   whom?	   The	  prototype	   steam	   engine	   has	   power,	   so	   does	  Watt’s	   imagination,	   if	   you	   are	   asking	  yourself:	  where	  does	   the	  power	  of	   steam	  come	   from,	   if	   you	   really	  want	   to	   trace	   it	  back?	  Then	  you	  can	  never	  be	  sure	  about	  the	  boundaries	  of	  material	  life.	  Doesn’t	  Mrs	  Watt’s	   mythical	   kettle	   also	   embody	   something	   imaginative	   to	   do	   with	   its	   initial	  creation	  and	  then	  its	  creative	  evolution?	  Don’t	  we	  then	  have	  to	  conceive	  of	  humans,	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non-­‐humans	   and	   things	   as	   equally	   active	   agents	   operating	   on	   different	   registers?	  Could	  it	  be	  our	  task	  to	  describe	  the	  mediations?	  	  This	  is	  my	  world.	  Not	  the	  world	  of	  the	  guy	  whose	  happiness	  is	  flexible	  interest	  rates,	  or	  the	  other	  Citibank	  woman	  who	  says	  her	  world	  is	  a	  credit	  card	  that	  rewards	  her—and	   she	   has	   bright	   red	   shoes	   to	   prove	   it.	   Is	  my	  world	   the	  world	   of	   riding	   a	  motorcycle	  to	  work?	  Not	  really.	  If	  I	  have	  just	  demonstrated	  anything,	  it	  is	  that	  mine	  is	   a	   world	   of	   words,	   words	   that	   have	   this	   capacity	   to	   create	   pathways	   among	  different	  kinds	  of	  reality.	  Words,	  not	  language.	  Language,	  conceived	  of	  as	  ‘finding	  its	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  …	   in	   the	  purely	  apositive	  relations	  of	   the	   language	  system	  or	  code’,11	   is	  of	  no	   interest,	  but	  words	  have	  historical	   contingencies,	  and	   therefore	  capacities	   to	   jerk	   us	   around,	   surprise	   us	   as	   we	   wake	   up	   to	   some	   other	   kind	   of	  existence	   staring	   us	   in	   the	   face.	   Walter	   Benjamin	   spoke	   of	   ‘the	   tiny	   spark	   of	  contingency’,	  of	  the	  ‘here	  and	  now’,	  in	  a	  photograph,	  ‘with	  which	  reality	  has	  …	  seared	  the	   subject’.12	   Likewise,	   etymological	   tracings	   are	   unique	   pathways	   zig-­‐zagging	  across	   worlds,	   as	   in	   this	   elaboration	   of	   the	   word	   ‘world’	   itself:	   the	   English	   word	  ‘world’	  comes	  from	  the	  Old	  English	  weorold	  (-­uld),	  a	  compound	  of	  wer	  ‘man’	  and	  eld	  ‘age.’	   Wer,	   as	   in	   were-­‐wolf.	   World	   thus	   means	   roughly	   ‘Age	   of	   Man’.	   The	  corresponding	   word	   in	   Latin	   is	   mundus,	   literally	   ‘clean,	   elegant’,	   itself	   a	   loan	  translation	   of	  Greek	   cosmos	   ‘orderly	   arrangement’.	  While	   the	  Germanic	  word	   thus	  reflects	  a	  mythological	  notion	  of	  a	   ‘domain	  of	  Man’,	  presumably	  as	  opposed	   to	   the	  divine	   sphere	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   chthonic	   sphere	   of	   the	   underworld	   on	   the	  other,	   the	  Greco-­‐Latin	  term	  expresses	  a	  notion	  of	  creation	  as	  an	  act	  of	  establishing	  order	  out	  of	  chaos.13	  
—MULTIREALISM Unique	  pathways	   in	  and	  among	  the	  multiply-­‐real,	   then.	   I	  have	  read	  snippets	  about	  Bruno	   Latour’s	   forthcoming	   huge	   metaphysical	   tome,	   On	   the	   Different	   Modes	   of	  
Existence,	  which	  finds	  him	  completely	  by-­‐passing	  humanist	  phenomenology.	  Latour	  has	   wicked	   little	   digs	   at	   the	   phenomenological	   orthodoxy,	   caricaturing	   it	   as	   so	  metaphysically	  challenged	  that	  most	  philosophers	  don’t	  even	  need	  the	  fingers	  of	  one	  hand	  to	  be	  able	  to	  count	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  ways	  of	   ‘being	  in	  the	  world’.	  They	  recognise	   only	   two,	   the	   objective	   and	   the	   subjective.	   Everything	   they	   encounter	   is	  heading	   either	   to	   the	   status	   of	   the	   solid	   brick	   or	   towards	   that	   of	   ineffable	   human	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consciousness.	   But	   despite	   that,	   they	   love	   to	   announce	   that	   there	   is	   a	   ‘beyond	  subject	  and	  object’,	  or	  a	  ‘beyond	  nature	  and	  culture’.	  So	  they	  arrive	  at	  finger	  number	  three,	  but	  have	  no	  idea	  what	  they	  are	  counting	  on	  it.14	  In	   Latour’s	   more	   ecological	   multirealist	   philosophy,	   things	   can	   exist	   without	  being	  a	  function	  of	  the	  way	  humans	  look	  at	  the	  world,	  as	  it	  everything	  hung	  off	  that	  relationship.	   The	   Copernican	   revolution	  may	   be	   over,	  when	  God	  was	   scientifically	  dethroned	  and	  Man	  became	  central,	  giving	  rise	  via	  the	  Enlightenment	  to	  the	  last	  few	  hundred	  years	  of	  secular	  humanism.	  Latour’s	  idea	  of	  admitting	  all	  sorts	  of	  ‘beings’	  as	  actors	  is	  central	  to	  this	  new	  multirealism:	  an	  apple	  can	  be	  an	  actor,	  as	  can	  a	  breath	  of	  wind,	   a	   concept	   such	   as	   happiness	   or	   a	   person.	   Then	   they	   gather	   to	   form	   hybrid	  alliances,	   as	   in	   the	   way	   our	   domestic	   households	   function	   as	   a	   shifting	   set	   of	  alliances	  of	  humans,	  plants,	  animals	  and	  inanimate	  objects,	  forming	  relations	  all	  the	  time.	  	  In	  Latour’s	  philosophy	  each	  actor	  is	  respectfully	  admitted	  into	  a	  democracy	  of	  such	   relations.	   One	   tries	   not	   to	   reduce	   one	   thing	   to	   being	   the	   effect	   of	   something	  else,	   in	   the	  manner	   that	   a	   sociology	   can	   reduce	   a	   religious	   experience	   to	   a	   set	   of	  structures	  and	  functions,	  or	  a	  religion	  can	  reduce	  AIDS-­‐preventing	  condoms	  to	  a	  sin	  against	  human	   fertility.	  These	  sorts	  of	   reductions	  can,	  and	  are,	  made,	  more	  or	   less	  convincingly,	   but	   only	   through	   a	   series	   of	   hard-­‐won	   negotiations	   and	  transformations	  from	  one	  link	  to	  another	  in	  a	  network	  of	  associations.	  Politics,	   unsurprisingly,	   lies	   in	   the	   relative	   strength	   or	   weakness	   of	   such	  alliances.	   If	   you	  want	   to	   prove	   that	   the	   earth	  moves	   around	   the	   sun,	   you’d	   better	  gather	   allies	   to	   your	   cause	   (telescopes,	   rational	   calculations,	   diagrams	   and	  influential	   friends	   and	   patrons)	   before	   the	   Inquisition,	   with	   the	   help	   of	   its	   allies,	  burns	   you	   at	   the	   stake.	   But	   from	   a	   philosophical	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   principle	   of	  ‘irreduction’,	  as	  Latour	  calls	  it,	  introduces	  politeness	  into	  the	  discussion	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  centuries,	  as	  Latour’s	  ‘multi-­‐naturalism’	  urges	  us	  to	  respect	  different	  modes	  of	  existence.	  So	  Latour	  has	  to	  take	  off	  one	  sock	  to	  count	  his	  modes	  of	  existence;	  there	  may	  be	  up	  to	  fourteen	  in	  various	  combinations	  in	  his	  system.	  If	  you	  are	  used	  to	  philosophers	  thumping	  on	  tables	  or	  pointing	  at	  glasses	  of	  water	  when	  they	  want	  to	  evoke	  the	  real,	  then	  this	  can	  no	  longer	  happen	  with	  him.	  There	  are	  no	  primary,	  more	  solid	  realties	  followed	  up	  by	  secondary	  effects	  like	  subtle	  feelings	  or	  meanings.	  Rather,	  everything	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is	  real,	  and	   it	   is	  approached	  with	  a	  rigorously	  empirical	  and	  experimental	  attitude.	  This	  means	  that	  everything	  is	  a	  work	  in	  progress	  as	  a	  negotiable	  alliance	  of	  things.	  A	  religious	   ceremony	   can	   attain	   its	   desired	   reality	   as	   a	   mode	   of	   religious	   existence	  through	  the	  alliance	  of	  all	  that	  is	  needed:	  a	  congregation	  and	  a	  representative	  of	  God,	  sacred	   words,	   artefacts	   and	   icons,	   music,	   the	   smell	   of	   incense.	   It	   is	   a	   work	   in	  progress	  because	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	  effort;	  if	  its	  reality	  were	  given	  in	  advance	  it	  would	  reduce	  to	  dogma	  and	  have	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  existence	  as	  other	  forms	  of	  dogma.	  Since	  the	  Enlightenment,	  humans	  have	  stopped	  seeing	  themselves	  as	  God’s	  pale	  creatures,	   and	   became	   central	   to	   their	   own	   thought.	   But	   in	   Latour’s	   scheme	   the	  human	   has	   no	   special	   mode	   of	   existence,	   and	   so	   in	   this	   it	   differs	   markedly	   from	  humanist	   philosophies	   that	   work	   so	   hard	   at	   maintaining	   the	   human/non-­‐human	  divide.	   In	   his	   political	   ecology,	   humans	   are	   not	   central.	   We	   are,	   after	   all,	   only	   a	  couple	  of	  chromosomes	  away	  from	  chimpanzees.	  But	   living	  things	  as	  a	  whole	  class	  reproduce,	  so	  reproduction	  is	  one	  of	  his	  many	  modes	  of	  existence,	  and	  I	  want	  to	  link	  it	  to	  vitality	  a	  bit	  later	  on.15	  
—OBJECT-ORIENTED WRITING	  It	   seems	   too	   naïve	   to	   ask,	   but	   how	   do	   you	   break	   out	   of	   the	   formula:	   ‘I	   am	  interpreting	  the	  world’?	  We	  might	  assert	  two	  things	  first	  of	  all	  as	  premises:	  1)	  there	  is	  no	  line	  of	  communication	  between	  subject	  and	  object;	  and	  2)	  along	  that	  fictional	  line	  between	  subject	  and	  objects	  there	  would	  be	  no	  gaps,	  metaphysical	  voids	  or	  in-­‐between	  spaces	   to	  get	   lyrical	  about.	  The	  conceptual	   image	  a	   lot	  of	  us	  share	  now	  is	  more	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  network	  of	  shifting	  relations	  sustaining	  a	  range	  of	  delicate	  existences.	   So	   then	   we	   might	   experiment	   in	   this	   direction	   with	   something	   I	   am	  calling	   object-­oriented	  writing,16	   for	  which	   the	   slogan	   is,	   ‘let	   the	   object	   talk	   to	   the	  writing’—without	   worrying	   too	  much	   about	   defining	   the	   object,	   this	   move	   in	   the	  experiment	   is	   heuristic—it	   is	   about	   respecting	   the	   strangeness,	   as	   anthropologist	  Mick	  Taussig	  says:	  It	  is	  more	  like	  having	  the	  reality	  depicted	  turn	  back	  on	  the	  writing,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  writer,	  and	  ask	  for	  a	  fair	  shake.	   ‘What	  have	  you	  learned?’	  the	  reality	   asks	   of	   the	   writing.	   ‘What	   remains	   as	   an	   excess	   that	   can’t	   be	  assimilated	  and	  what	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do	  with	  the	  gift	  that	  I	  bestow,	  I	  who	  am	  such	  strange	  stuff?’17	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In	  Creative	   Evolution,	   Bergson	   says:	   ‘The	   idea	   that	   for	   a	   new	  object	  we	  might	  have	   to	   create	   a	   new	   concept,	   perhaps	   a	   new	   method	   of	   thinking,	   is	   deeply	  repugnant	  to	  us.’18	  This	  is	  because	  we	  have	  our	  carefully	  constructed	  macro	  systems,	  deduced	   from	   describable	   micro	   elements.	   But	   the	   ‘strange	   stuff’	   talking	   to	   the	  writing;	   this	   is	   suggesting	   to	  me	   a	   slogan	   like	   respect	   the	   signature	   of	   the	   thing	   (a	  wonderful	   object	   will	   feel	   let	   down	   if	   you	   write	   something	   boring	   about	   it,	  something	  that	  reduces	  it	  to	  macro	  principles	  (Newton’s	  laws	  of	  motion),	  or	  gets	  lost	  in	  the	  micro	  detail	  (it	  is	  largely	  made	  up	  of	  carbon	  atoms).	  Isabelle	  Stengers	  offers	  a	  way	  out	  with	  what	  she	  calls	  the	  meso	   level.	  She	  might	  ask:	  What	  is	  the	  character	  of	  the	  motorcycle?	  What	  makes	  the	  tyres	  stick	  to	  the	  road	  as	  it	  leans	  fast	  into	  a	  corner?	  There	  are	  (macro)	  Newtonian	  answers,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  (micro)	  answers	  about	  the	  temperature	   of	   rubber	   molecules.	   But	   the	   meso	   level	   is	   what	   the	   head	   Kawasaki	  mechanic	   knows	   about	   a	   certain	   race-­‐bred	  model	   and	   how	   it	   will	   respond	   at	   the	  Phillip	   Island	   track	   in	   the	   rain.	   It	   is	   the	  mechanic’s	   feeling	   for	   the	   character	  of	   the	  machine	  that	  the	  driver	  trusts	  when	  he	  switches	  tyres.	  It’s	  all	  about	  keeping	  things	  alive	  in	  particular	  places.	  
—WHAT? THINGS ARE ALIVE?	  	  Not	   just	  keeping	   the	  motorcycle	  racer	  alive,	  but	  possibly	   the	  culture	  of	  motorcycle	  sports	  which	  depends	  on	  a	  whole	  bunch	  of	  affective	  relations.	  The	  love	  of	  the	  thing.	  Multiple	  connections	  enhance	   the	   life	  of	   the	  machine;	   it	   is	  a	  complex	  object	  which,	  like	  anything	  that	   is	  not	  an	  atom,	   is	  composed,	  and	  keeps	  on	  being	  composed,	  built	  on,	  by	  those	  who	  participate	  in	  its	  life.	  So	  now,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Bruno	  Latour,	  I	  want	  to	   think	  about	  objects	   like	  motorcycles	   (or	  humans	  or	   snails)	   as	  animated	   in	   their	  multiple	   connections,	   carefully	   forged	   and	   nurtured,	   rather	   than	   following	   the	  materialist	  orthodoxy:	  One	   of	   the	   principal	   causes	   of	   the	   scorn	   poured	   by	   the	  Moderns	   on	   the	  sixteenth	  century	  is	  that	  those	  poor	  archaic	  folks,	  who	  had	  the	  misfortune	  of	   living	   on	   the	   wrong	   side	   of	   the	   ‘epistemological	   break’,	   believed	   in	   a	  world	  animated	  by	  all	  sorts	  of	  entities	  and	  forces	  instead	  of	  believing,	  like	  any	   rational	   person,	   in	   an	   inanimate	   matter	   producing	   its	   effects	   only	  through	  the	  power	  of	  its	  causes…	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This	  conceit	  has	   the	  strange	  result	  of	  composing	  the	  world	  with	   long	  concatenations	  of	  causes	  and	  effects	  where	  (this	  is	  what	  is	  so	  odd)	  nothing	  
is	  supposed	  to	  happen,	  except,	  probably	  at	  the	  beginning—but	  since	  there	  is	  no	  God	  in	  those	  staunchly	  secular	  versions,	  there	  is	  not	  even	  a	  beginning	  …	  The	  disappearance	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  so	  called	  ‘materialist	  world	  view’	  is	  a	  stunning	  invention	  especially	  since	  it	  is	  contradicted	  every	  step	  of	  the	  way	  by	   the	   odd	   resistance	   of	   reality:	   every	   consequence	   adds	   slightly	   to	   the	  cause.	  Thus,	  it	  has	  to	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  agency.19	  So	   what	   is	   the	   consequence	   of	   this	   animist	   attitude	   that	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	  sounding	   New	   Age-­‐ish?	   It	   makes	   me	   write	   differently	   for	   a	   start.	   I	   approach	   the	  machine	   bearing	   the	   name	   of	   god	   with	   trepidation	   and	   with	   affection.	   In	   the	  background	   is	   a	  memory,	   from	  years	  ago,	  of	  bringing	  home	  a	  Velocette	  MAC350.	   I	  started	  it	  up	  and	  it	  roared	  into	  life.	  But	  the	  carburettor	  was	  jammed.	  I	  tried	  to	  shut	  it	  down	   by	   putting	   it	   into	   gear,	   but	   it	   went	   wild	   in	   the	   garden,	   churning	   up	   my	  mother’s	   asparagus	   patch,	   before	   I	   finally	   subdued	   it.	   Today	   the	   life	   of	   the	   Deus	  depends	  in	  part	  on	  another	  woman,	  my	  partner	  Patience,	  who	  says,	  ‘I’m	  telling	  you	  now,	  I’ll	  not	  be	  visiting	  you	  in	  hospital,	  so	  take	  care.’	  The	  object	  engenders	  life,	  like	  a	  pebble	  always	  creating	  ripples	  in	  its	  place,	  spreading	  out	  and	  engaging	  other	  beings	  and	  other	  worlds.	  Its	   life	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  mythology	  it	  carries,	   its	  deep	  historical	  meanings	   that	   in	   turn	   engender	   affect	   and	   sense.	  What	   kinds	   of	   human	  dreams	  are	   there	   in	   the	  story,	  composing	  all	   this	  material	   into	  wondrous	  speeding	  contrivances?	  	  So	  the	  animist	  attitude	  is	  compositionist	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  acknowledges	  the	  agency	  of	   all	   the	  elements	  of	   the	   composition.	  Yet	  our	   secular	  materialism	   tells	  us	  that	   we	   can’t	   mix	   dreams	   with	   memories,	   with	   speculations	   about	   the	   origins	   of	  petrol	  in	  pre-­‐historic	  rainforests.	  It	  urges	  us	  to	  treat	  things	  as	  if	  they	  were	  all	  dead.	  This	  is	  the	  same	  materialism	  that	  tries	  to	  maintain	  a	  strict	  ranking	  of	  importance	  of	  actors	   in	  a	   reality	  as	   complex	  and	  as	   interrelated	  as	   ‘the	  economy’.	   For	  which,	   the	  ‘bottom	  line’	  is,	  what?	  Exchange	  value?	  Resource	  wealth?	  In	  relation	  to	  that	  mightily	  powerful	  set	  of	  stories	  and	  rituals	  we	  call	  the	  Economy,	  we	  also	  have	  to	  bring	  ‘trust’,	  ‘investor	  confidence’,	   fantastic	  arrays	  of	  numbers,	  not	   to	  mention	  a	  certain	   type	  of	  office	  décor,	  suit	  and	  haircut	  to	  inspire	  that	  same	  ‘investor	  confidence’.	  Then	  there	  is	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an	  advertising	   campaign	   to	  mobilise	  our	  desires	   for	  home,	   as	  Citibank	  urges	  us	   to	  take	  out	  a	  flexible	  loan,	  and	  forget	  the	  sub-­‐prime	  catastrophe.	  It	  is	  taking	  up	  a	  multirealist	  embrace	  that	  is	  the	  issue	  here.	  For	  us	  humans	  that	  means	  writing	  the	  multirealist	  experience,	  something	  we	  who	  have	  ‘been	  there’	  can	  try	   to	   report	   on	   even	   as	   we	   create	   it.	   Our	   reports	   ‘from	   the	   field’	   try	   not	   to	   be	  reductions	   to	  one	   level	  of	   reality	   (the	  experience	  of	   the	  motorcycle	   reduced	   to	   the	  signs	   and	   functions	   of	   the	   strictly	   materialist	   language	   of,	   say,	   mechanical	  engineering	  or	  of	  sociology;	   that	   is,	  a	  purely	  referential	   language),	  but	  reports	  that	  envelop	  the	  poetry,	  the	  sensorium,	  the	  history,	  the	  mythology	  and	  the	  politics.	  The	  whole	  damn	  culture	  in	  other	  words.	  What	  kind	  of	  energy	  does	   this	   culturally	  composed	  world	  run	  on,	   for	   it	   is	  not	  the	   machine	   of	   knowledge	   accumulation,	   or	   the	   combustion	   engine	   of	   critique	  (which	   Latour	   famously	   described	   as	   ‘running	   out	   of	   steam’).	   In	   the	   humanities,	  critique	   is	   the	   engine	   of	   debunking,	   revealing,	   or	   unmasking	   the	   reality	   that	   lies	  behind	  mere	  appearances:	  Critique,	   in	   other	   words,	   has	   all	   the	   limits	   of	   utopia:	   it	   relies	   on	   the	  certainty	   of	   the	   world	   beyond	   this	   word.	   By	   contrast,	   for	   composition,	  there	  is	  no	  world	  of	  beyond.	  It	  is	  all	  about	  immanence.	  	   The	   difference	   is	   not	   moot,	   because	  what	   can	   be	   critiqued	   cannot	   be	  
composed.	  It	  is	  really	  a	  mundane	  question	  of	  having	  the	  right	  tools	  for	  the	  right	  job.	  With	  a	  hammer	  (or	  a	  sledge	  hammer)	  in	  hand	  you	  can	  do	  a	  lot	  of	  things:	  break	  down	  walls,	  destroy	  idols,	  ridicule	  prejudices,	  but	  not	  repair,	  take	  care,	  assemble,	  reassemble,	  stitch	  together.	   It	   is	  no	  more	  possible	   to	  compose	   with	   the	   paraphernalia	   of	   critique	   than	   it	   is	   to	   cook	   with	   a	  seesaw.20	  So	  what	  will	   keep	   the	   compositional	  machine	   going?	   This	  writing	  machine	   that	   is	  neither	  interpreting	  the	  world	  nor	  denouncing	  its	  false	  appearances?	  What	  will	  give	  life	  to	  words?	  The	  same	  thing,	  I	  argue,	  that	  gives	  life	  to	  other	  things;	  the	  capacity	  to	  reproduce,	  reproduce,	  that	  is,	  with	  carefully	  chosen	  partners.	  
—REPRODUCTION AND READING In	   1979,	   literary	   and	   cultural	   theorist	   Tony	   Bennett	   had	   the	   insight	   that	   if	  ‘production	   is	   completed	   only	  with	   consumption,	   then,	   so	   far	   as	   literary	   texts	   are	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concerned,	   their	   production	   is	   never	   completed.	   They	   are	   endlessly	   re-­produced,	  endlessly	   remade	   with	   different	   political	   consequences	   and	   effects.’21	   To	   this	  important	   insight	   about	   intertextual	   effects,	   we	   can	   attempt	   to	   flesh	   out	   the	  multimodal	  or	  multirealist	  networks	  that	   intersect	   in	  a	  writing	  or	  reading	  event	   in	  order	   to	   ask	   how	   the	   literary	   text	   is	   keeping	   itself	   alive	   in	   its	   place(s),	   how	   it	   is	  reproducing	  itself	  and	  its	  culture.	  Latour	  insists	  that	  there	  are	  ontologically	  different	  modes	   of	   existence	   involved	   in	   any	   event.	   ‘Reference’	   is	   about	   the	   chains	   along	  which	  knowledge	  is	  transferred,	  whereas	  ‘reproduction’	  is	  about	  something	  else:	  the	  world	   of	   ‘matter’,	   [Nature]	   is	  made	   of	   at	   least	   two	   entirely	   different	  layers	  of	  meaning:	  one	  consists	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  reference	  chains	  need	  to	  be	  arrayed	   so	  as	   to	  work,	  by	  giving	  us	  knowledge	  of	   far	   away	  entities	  and	   processes	   of	   all	   kinds;	   but	   the	   other	   is	   provided	   by	   a	   completely	  different	   kind	   of	   mode,	   and	   that	   is	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   entities	  themselves	  manage	  to	  stay	  in	  existence.	  Having	  called	  the	  first	  reference,	  I	  will	  call	  this	  second	  reproduction	  …	  These	  two	  contrasts,	  or	  to	  call	  them	  by	  a	   more	   ontological	   term,	   these	   two	   modes	   of	   existence,	   have	   been	  constantly	   confused	   by	  modernism,	   but	   this	   confusion	   does	   not	   need	   to	  continue	  with	  ecology.22	  Unlike	  motorcycles,	  reproduction	  tends	  to	  go	  at	  a	  snail’s	  pace,	  depending	  on,	  I	  guess,	   what	   the	   speedo	   is	   connected	   to.	   In	   ‘The	   Snail	   Watcher’,	   a	   short	   story	   by	  Patricia	  Highsmith,	  a	  bunch	  of	  snails	  get	  seriously	  out	  of	  control.23	  This	   is	  how	  the	  story	   goes:	   One	   evening	   in	   his	   kitchen,	   Peter	   Knoppert,	   mild-­‐mannered	   stock-­‐broker,	   is	  observing	  some	  snails	   in	  a	  bowl.	  They	  are	  destined	   for	   the	  dinner	   table,	  but	  he	  is	  drawn	  further	  into	  observation,	  and	  then	  fascination,	  as	  he	  attends	  to	  the	  languid	   lovemaking	  of	  a	  pair	  of	   snails.	   (These	  hermaphroditic	  creatures	  reproduce	  by	  inseminating	  each	  other	  over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  to	  twelve	  hours).	  Knoppert	  loses	  his	  appetite,	  gains	  another,	  becomes	  obsessed	  with	  his	  snails;	  he	  saves	   them	   from	  the	  pot	  and	  takes	  them	  to	  his	  library,	  where	  he	  is	  delighted	  by	  their	  prolific	  fertility.	  He	  does	  research	  in	  the	  local	  library,	  where	  he	  finds:	  a	  sentence	  from	  Darwin’s	  Origin	  of	  Species	  …	  the	  sentence	  was	  in	  French,	  a	  language	  Mr.	   Knoppert	   did	   not	   know,	   but	   the	  word	   sensualité	  made	   him	  tense	   like	   a	   bloodhound	   that	   has	   suddenly	   found	   its	   scent	   …	   snails	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manifested	  a	  sensuality	  in	  their	  mating	  that	  was	  not	  to	  be	  found	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  animal	  kingdom.	  (5)	  This	   key	  word	   sensuality	   drives	   not	   only	   a	   story	   but	   also	   a	   kind	   of	   contemporary	  cultural	   theory,	   embracing	   affect.	   How	   could	   we	   not	   say	   that	   the	   perceived	  ‘sensuality’	   of	   snails	   is	   worthy	   of	   knowledge	   and	   respect?	   That	   it	   reproduces	  knowledge	   and	   respect?	   Otherwise	  we	   reduce	   the	   life	   of	   snails	   to	   the	   language	   of	  reference,	  where	  only	  object-­‐relations	  can	  move	   them,	  and	  move	   their	  relations	   to	  us.	  	   By	  now	  there	  are	  hundreds	  of	  snails	   in	  his	  room	  at	  home,	  he	  disappears	  of	  an	  evening	  to	  be	  with	  them.	  His	  wife	  is	  concerned	  with	  this	  obsession,	  but	  it	  seems	  to	  make	  him	  happy,	  even	  at	  work:	  His	  colleagues	   in	   the	  brokerage	  office	  noticed	  a	  new	  zest	   for	   life	   in	  Peter	  Knoppert.	   He	   became	   more	   daring	   in	   his	   moves,	   more	   brilliant	   in	   his	  calculations,	  became	  in	  fact	  a	  little	  vicious	  in	  his	  schemes,	  but	  he	  brought	  money	  in	  for	  his	  company.	  By	  unanimous	  vote	  his	  basic	  salary	  was	  raised	  from	  forty	  to	  sixty	  thousand	  dollars	  per	  year.	  When	  anyone	  congratulated	  him	  on	  his	  achievements,	  Mr.	  Knoppert	  gave	  all	  the	  credit	  to	  his	  snails	  and	  the	  beneficial	  relaxation	  he	  derived	  from	  watching	  them.	  (7)	  But	   the	   fertility	   of	   the	   snails	   becomes	   heavy	   and	   sinister,	   leading	   to	   the	   death	   of	  Knoppert.	  As	  he	   succumbs	  beneath	   the	  weight	  of	   snails	   in	  his	   room,	  he	   sees	  a	  pot	  plant,	   ‘A	   pair	   of	   snails	  were	   quietly	  making	   love	   in	   it.	   And	   right	   beside	   them,	   tiny	  snails	  as	  pure	  as	  dewdrops	  were	  emerging	  from	  a	  pit	  like	  an	  infinite	  army	  into	  their	  widening	  world.’	  (10)	  And	  that	  is	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story.	  My	  story	   is	   a	   summary	  of	   a	  piece	  of	   literature,	   and	  of	   course	   it	   illustrates	  my	  reproduction	   theme.	   I	  want	   to	  argue	   that	   literary	  works	  reproduce	   like	  snails,	   like	  living	   things,	   given	   the	   right	   conditions.	   They	   have	   to	   be	   provided	  with	   a	   culture,	  which	   includes	   a	   certain	  devotion,	   like	  Knoppert’s	   devotion	   to	  his	   snails.	   This	  will	  involve	   conceiving	   literature	   as	   something	   that	   is	   always	   in	   the	   process	   of	   being	  made	   and	   thus	   can	   fail	   to	   be	   made,	   to	   be	   ‘instaured’,	   a	   curious	   word	   that	   Bruno	  Latour	  and	  Isabelle	  Stengers	  found	  in	  Etienne	  Souriau.	  Stengers	  says,	  ‘I	  like	  Etienne	  Souriau’s	  concept	  of	  “instauration”	  (establishment,	   institution)	  very	  much	  because,	  as	   regards	   the	   artist	   at	  work,	   it	   deploys	   a	   quite	   fabulous	   assemblage	   denying	   any	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power	  to	  the	  old	  conflict	  between	  determination	  and	  freedom’.24	  But	  what	  does	  she	  mean	  by	  that?	  Patricia	   Highsmith,	   in	   a	   literary	   experiment,	   created	   a	   character	   whose	  devotion	   to	   snails	   changed	   the	   form	   of	   his	   life,	   and	   theirs.	   He	   became	  more	   than	  human	  and	   gained	   vitality;	   they	  became	  more	   than	   snail	   and	  more	   sinister.	   These	  fictional	   beings	   cross	   two	   distinct	   modes	   of	   existence,	   the	   fictional	   and	   the	  reproductive.	   Strange,	   isn’t	   it,	   that	   characters	   in	   novels	   are	   rarely	   talked	   about	   as	  being	   ‘fictional	   beings’,	   as	   if	   their	   existence	   were	   created	   and	   maintained	   in	   a	  genuine	  ontological	  difference.	  More	  often,	  critics	  labour	  to	  link	  them	  to	  contexts,	  to	  real	   human	   beings	   they	   are	   ‘loosely	   based	   on’	   vaguely	   ‘reflecting’	   and	   so	   on,	   all	  because	  of	   the	  poverty	  of	   the	  subject–object	  polarity	  (the	   two	  concepts	   like	  hooks,	  Latour	   jokes,	   to	   suspend	   the	   hammock	   destined	   for	   philosophical	   snoozing.)25	   A	  special	  kind	  of	  existence	  has	  to	  be	  coaxed	  into	  being	  by	  writers	  of	  fiction;	  it	  doesn’t	  arrive	   without	   considerable	   labour.	   Likewise	   with	   the	   readers.	   They	   approach	  fictional	  beings	  with	  enough	  devotion	  to	  sustain	  the	  latters’	  existence.	  What	  is	  going	  on	  in	  this	  complex	  web,	  creating	  and	  maintaining	  the	  delicate	  existence	  of	  fictional	  beings?	   Characters	   like	   Madame	   Bovary	   or	   Mickey	   Mouse,	   immortal	   beings,	   or	   a	  person	  like	  the	  US	  president,	  who	  starts	  off	  as	  a	  being	  with	  a	  reproductive	  existence,	  then	  as	  he	  becomes	  an	  object	  of	  knowledge,	  a	  referential	   existence,	   then	   finally	  he	  acquires	  a	  fictional	  existence	  as	  well,	  once	  the	  myth-­‐making	  work	  is	  done	  to	  invent	  him	  as	  a	  character.	  The	  work	  of	  art	  is	  mechanically	  reproduced,	  as	  we	  know,	  but	  so	  too	  must	  be	  the	  vitality	   that	   sustains	   the	   immortal	   beings	   who	   hover	   around	   the	   page	   of	   fiction.	  While	  a	   literary	   text,	   as	  an	  object,	   is	  not	   ‘alive’,	   its	   existence	   is	  defined	   through	   its	  active	  relations	  with	  other	  things,	  human	  and	  non-­‐human,	  in	  a	  complex	  ecology.	  The	  capacity	  of	  a	  writing	  to	   ‘live’	   is	  neither	  engendered	  by	  the	  life	  of	  the	  writer,	  nor	  by	  any	  felicitous	  fit	  that	  the	  writing,	  as	  representation,	  may	  have	  with	  a	  world.	  Neither	  freedom	  nor	  determination,	  as	  I	  think	  Stengers	  was	  saying.	  It	  is	  through	  its	  capacity	  to	  form	  new	  relations:	  writing	  with	  rather	  than	  writing	  about.	  Writing	  down	  words	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  ‘enter	  into	  new	  partnerships’,	  as	  they	  say.	  Peter	  Knoppert’s	  snail-­‐becoming	  is	  a	  successful	  inter-­‐species	  literary	  experiment	  that	  needs	  just	  this	  singular	   character	   to	  manifest	   itself	   in	   its	   sudden	  accomplishment.	   It	   is	   something	  that	  a	  piece	  of	  straight	  prose,	  a	  ‘report	  to	  the	  academy’,	  cannot	  do,	  because	  it	  exists	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only	   in	   a	   referential	   existential	   register,	   rather	   than	   a	   reproductive	   one.	   Now	   the	  generic	  seed	  is	  sown,	  you	  too	  can	  create	  another	  Knoppert	  character,	  this	  time	  with,	  say,	  dragonflies.	  Now	  what	  does	  the	  reader	  do	  to	  help	  sustain	  this	  literary	  life?	  In	  reading	  a	  text	  they	  create	  their	  own	  instaurations,	  by	  bringing	  characters	  ‘to	  life’	  for	  instance.	  This	  ancient	   Leavisite	   category	   of	   Life	   can	   be	   revived	   and	   retheorised.	   It	   will	   not	   be	   a	  question	  of	  applying	  a	  reductive	  reading,	  a	  Marxist	  reading	  or	  reading	  ‘with	  Butler’	  as	   students	   are	   wont	   to	   say.	   These	   are	   class	   exercises,	   not	   the	   kind	   of	   regular	  everyday	   imaginative	   readings	   that	   read	  Blake	   as	  Blake,	   if	   you	   like,	  without	   being	  drowned	  out	  by	  Marx’s	  voice.	  My	  analytic	  method	  will	  now	  ask	  two	  questions	  of	  the	  text:	  How	   is	   it	   keeping	   itself	   alive	   in	   its	   place?	   (I	   am	   refusing	   there	   the	  modernist	  universalisms	  that	  suggest	  works	  of	  art	  are	  ungrounded,	  that	  they	   ‘transcend’	  time	  and	  place.)	  And	  the	  second	  question	  I	  ask	  is:	  What	  are	  its	  partners	  for	  reproductive	  
purposes?	  At	   this	  point	   ‘the	  Marxist	  reading’	  can	  be	  brought	  back	  as	  a	  partnership,	  not	  as	  a	  reduction.	  Or	  the	  offer	  to	  read	  ‘with	  Butler’	  is	  an	  invitation	  to	  go	  on	  a	  date:	  I	  can’t	   take	   this	   story	   out	   clubbing	   just	   by	   myself,	   I	   need	   another	   highly	   desirable	  partner	   as	   well.	   Two	   things	   then:	   place-­‐based	   devotion	   or	   cultivation,	   and	   no	  reproduction	  without	   getting	   partners	   to	   come	   to	   the	   party.	   And	   of	   course	   in	   the	  ecology	   of	   the	   literary	   event	   there	   are	   all	   sorts	   of	   partnerships:	   a	   comfortable	  armchair,	  Coleridge’s	  tranquility,	  not	  to	  mention	  knowledge	  and	  training	  in	  certain	  sorts	  of	  affect	  acquisition.	  Or	  in	  the	  college	  ecology,	  literary	  events	  have	  a	  different	  mix	  sustaining	  the	  literary	  life.26	  The	   critical	   prose	   I	   have	   ‘reproduced’	   about	   ‘The	   Snail	  Watcher’	   attempts	   to	  retain	  the	  multidimensionality	  of	  fiction	  by	  animating	  Highsmith’s	  story	  (as	  object)	  into	   a	   system	   of	   reproduction	   that	   can	   be	   generalised	   across	   various	   ecologies,	  including	  the	  events	  of	  dissemination	  and	  teaching.	  It	  holds	  back	  from	  judgement	  as	  a	   sovereign	   capacity	   (the	   always	   threatening,	   arbitrary	   and	   sudden	   ‘judgement	   of	  God’).	   It	   would	   prefer,	   without	   yet	   fully	   realising	   it,	   a	   sustained	   argument	   or	  negotiation	  that	  gathers	  allies	  (co-­‐workers)	  around	  a	  ‘matter	  of	  concern’	  in	  order	  to	  build	  something,	  to	  compose	  a	  text,	  or	  a	  corpus	  of	  texts.	  Additional	  questions	  for	  this	  matter	   of	   concern	   would	   include:	   what	   makes	   the	   literary	   text	   multirealist?	   How	  powerful	  is	  (the	  imagination	  of)	  non-­‐human	  agency	  in	  such	  texts?	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If	   there	   is	   to	   be	   a	   criticism	   without	   judgement,	   then	   it	   should	   avoid	   that	  transcendentalism	  that	   insists	  on	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  the	  text,	   its	  paradoxes	  and	  ambivalences	   so	   that	   only	   in	   the	   transcendental	   move	   (demonstrated	   as	   an	  intellectual	   striving	  by	   the	   student)	   can	  an	  elusive	   infinite	  unity	  be	  glimpsed	   for	   a	  brief	  rewarding	  moment.	  Rather,	  the	  radically	  empirical	  procedure	  simply	  provides	  
formulae	   for	  composition	  within	  a	  historically	  and	  empirically	  given	   tradition,	  with	  which	  the	  student	  can	  experiment	  to	  see	  if	  they	  work.	  Criticism	  in	  this	  context	  is	  not	  (of	  course)	  ‘saying	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  things’,	  or	  in	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  fashion	  calibrating	  moral	  thresholds,	  classifying	  and	  judging,	  and	  setting	  ‘standards’.	  It	  is	  not	  about	  cultivating	  openness	  (or	  celebrating	  gaps	  and	  indeterminacies).	   It	   is,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   about	   real	   relations	   (which	   may	   be	  speculative),	  and	  robust	  pragmatic	  connections	  across	  an	  array	  of	  different	  modes	  of	  existence.	  Many	  of	  these	  critical	  reformulations	  derive	  from	  Ian	  Hunter’s	  work,	  which	  to	  some	   may	   look	   like	   he	   is	   supporting	   the	   status	   quo	   by	   failing	   to	   accede	   to	   the	  dialectic	   of	   history27	   and	   thus	   welcome	   ‘breakthrough	   phenomena’.28	   In	   fact	   he	  argues	  that	  newness	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  into	  the	  world	  through	  ‘protracted	  hand-­‐to-­‐hand	   intellectual	   battles’29	   than	   it	   is	   by	   cultivating	   an	   intellectual	   persona	  who	  performs	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   an	   openness	   to	   novelties	   which	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	  metaphysically	  infinite	  than	  specific.	  
—CRITICISM WITHOUT JUDGEMENT	  Having	  made	  this	  excursion	  via	  literary	  theory	  to	  recover	  the	  concept	  of	  Life,	  barely,	  I	  want	  to	  finish	  with	  a	  couple	  of	  reflections	  on	  making	  a	  genre	  like	  fictocriticism	  do	  the	   experimental	   and	   compositional	   work	   I	   have	   outlined.	   What	   can	   fictocritical	  writing	  do	  that	  regular	  essays	  or	  stories	  can’t?	  Unlike	  the	  critical	  piece,	  it	  forestalls	  judgement	   in	   the	  necessary	   temporality	  of	   its	  performance.	  Unlike	   the	  short	   story,	  its	   ‘problem’	   is	   external	   to	   it:	   something	   comes	   from	  outside	   the	   literary	   field	   and	  disrupts	   the	  usual	  pattern	   for	   the	  genre.	  An	  example:	  an	  archeologist	   friend,	  Denis	  Byrne,	  living	  in	  Bali	  and	  disturbed	  by	  not	  being	  able	  to	  find	  objective	  evidence	  about	  the	  1965	  massacres	  anywhere	  on	  the	   island,	  starts	   to	  dig	   for	   layers	  of	  affect	   in	  his	  negotiations	   with	   people	   and	   things,	   and	   these	   find	   their	   writerly	   correlates	   in	  ‘Traces	   of	   ’65:	   Sites	   and	  Memories	   of	   the	   Post-­‐Coup	   Killings	   in	   Bali’,30	   so	   his	   new	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affective	  material	  changes	  his	  writing	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  objective	  is	  no	  longer	  self-­‐evident	   and	   has	   to	   be	   speculated	   about,	   yet	   still	   quite	   realistically.31	   It	   is	   a	  writing	  constantly	  partnered	  by	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  for	  my	  friend:	  the	  political	  pressure	  of	   the	   ghosts	   of	   the	   dead	   haunting	   the	   text,	   and	   thus	   haunting	   the	   discipline	   of	  archeology.	  	  Interruptions	  from	  outside	  the	  given	  discipline	  or	  field,	  then,	  are	  the	  taps	  on	  the	  shoulder	  that	  force	  the	  writing	  to	  write	  with	  new	  partners.	  I’m	  not	  sure	  if	  I	  can	  claim	  that	   this	   willingness	   to	   form	   new	   and	   often	   unlikely	   partnerships	   makes	  fictocriticism	  a	  lively	  genre,	  perhaps	  merely	  mischievous.	  I	  think	  it	  offers	  a	  way	  out	  of	  that	  familiar	  conceptual	  architecture	  that	  has	  had	  us	  ‘interpreting	  the	  world’	  and	  building	   up	   critical	   authority	   in	   the	   process.	   Now	   we	   negotiate,	   more	   politely	  perhaps,	  with	   stakeholders	   in	  matters	   of	   concern,	   some	   of	  whom	   are	   non-­‐human.	  Our	  literary	  events	  are	  just	  that,	  rather	  than	  items	  of	  communication,	  and	  they	  have	  to	  be	  performed	  in	  the	  writing	  and	  in	  the	  reading.	  And	  if	  they	  have	  a	  life,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  life	  that	  they	  have	  on	  their	  own.	  	  The	  first	  great	  Aboriginal	  writer	  and	  scholar,	  David	  Unaipon,	  wrote	  something	  back	   in	   the	  1920s	   that	   I	  will	  ponder	   forever.	  He	  was	   talking	  about	  a	   certain	  green	  frog	  and	  how	  its	  life	  depended	  on	  the	  Water	  Spirit:	  ‘Everything	  that	  exists	  has	  some	  life	  apart	  from	  itself’,	  he	  said.	  And	  this	  Water	  Spirit,	  he	  added,	  is	   ‘the	  most	  multiple	  spirit	  of	  all’.32	  Of	  course	  it	  is,	  it	  has	  all	  these	  lives	  to	  sustain	  in	  their	  places,	  and	  these	  existences	   include	  beings	  constituted	   in	  dreams,	  plants,	  animals,	  humans	  and	  their	  different	  cultures.	  The	  real	  challenge	  for	  making	  genres,	  I	  think,	  will	  be	  just	  how	  to	  use	   writing	   to	   trace	   pathways	   among	   multiple	   realities	   that	   affirm	   their	   own	  separate,	   but	   mutually	   sustaining,	   existences.	   To	   do	   this	   one	   must	   experiment,	  speculate	  with	  new	   relations	   among	   things,	   and	   earn	  participation	  before	   judging.	  When	  writing	  moves	  against	  alterity,	  creating	  the	  friction	  and	  heat	  of	  work,	  it	  rarely	  finds	  a	  liberation	  from	  constraint,	  as	  if	  the	  experiment	  would	  ‘open	  up	  new	  spaces’	  as	  critical	  utopianism	  would	  have	  it.	  Rather,	  I	  think,	  experiments	  are	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	   technology,	   like	  writing,	   to	  worlds	  which	  may	  not	   even	  have	  writing,	   and	  where	  the	  protocols	  are	  strange	  and	  compelling.	  —	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